ELECTORAL ARENA: ELEMENTS FOR A STRATEGIC MODEL OF PARTY BEHAVIOR AND ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE

Abstract

This paper outlines a theoretical perspective informed by the field of public choice, using empirical elements as examples. The field of public choice has been shaped by many thinkers and strives to understand and explain political behavior from economic motivations such as voters, candidates, parties, and bureaucrats. This approach is aligned with methodological individualism and was created as a reaction to the notion that governments act for the benefit of the common good. In this paper, we propose elements to build a model to analyze partisan competition by transposing elements from Porter’s Five Forces Model. This model has been applied for decades to competitive analysis among firms in the fields of economics and management. Economics, through Public Choice theory, postulates an “electoral market”; in this arena, parties and candidates compete for ballots (“preferences revealed,” like prices). In management, there is discussion about strategies and strategic management in the competition among firms.